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tral Bank, held in Frankfurt, Germany, April 3–4, 2006. 
The conference agenda and presentations are available  
at www.ecb.int/events/conferences/html/ccp.en.html.
Good afternoon and thank you for joining us today to 
discuss some important issues related to central coun-
terparty clearing. On behalf of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago (Chicago Fed), I want to thank our 
host and cosponsor of this conference, the European 
Central Bank (ECB). This has been a wonderful op-
portunity for us to discuss these issues with experts 
from around the world, and I hope that the participants 
here today have found these discussions helpful. The 
ECB and the Chicago Fed have worked together 
closely to plan the conference and agenda, and it has 
been a very good partnership.
Today, I’d like to share with you my thoughts 
about the important role that clearing and settlement 
institutions play in supporting financial markets. In 
particular, my remarks today will revolve around four 
key questions related to central counterparty clearing. 
First, what economic functions do central counterpar-
ties, or CCPs, perform in the clearing and settlement 
of financial transactions? Second, what alternative in-
stitutions can perform the same or economically equiv-
alent functions? Third, what are the costs and benefits 
of using CCPs as compared with alternative clearing 
institutions? And fourth, what do these costs and ben-
efits tell us about public policy decisions that should 
be made concerning CCPs and alternative institutions?
I do not expect to give definitive answers to these 
questions today. We just don’t know enough to provide 
such answers. But I think that careful consideration 
of these issues is essential to formulating good public 
policy. The wide variation in financial market structures 
and the fast pace of financial and technical innovation 
mean there may not be a single, “first-best” clearing 
solution that meets the needs of all markets. So, as a 
practical matter, it is not possible to formulate public 
policy without facing fundamental and unavoidable 
tradeoffs when comparing alternative structures for the 
clearing and settlement of financial transactions. I’ll 
elaborate on this theme in the course of my discussion.
Post-trade clearing and settlement are sometimes 
referred to as the “plumbing” of the financial system. 
This term may suggest that clearing and settlement 
systems are of secondary importance. In fact, however, 
they are more like the “central nervous system” of the 
financial system.1 Clearing and settlement systems 
provide vital linkages among components of the system, 
enabling them to work together smoothly. As such, 
clearing and settlement systems are critical for the 
performance of the economy. A key role then for pub-
lic policy is to ensure that these systems function well 
when confronted by a variety of stresses.
Centralized clearing arrangements utilizing CCPs 
have become more widespread in recent years, both 
for exchange-traded and over-the-counter (OTC) mar-
kets. This is no surprise, since they are extraordinarily 
good at what they do. As a consequence of this growth 
in CCP usage, central banks, securities regulators, 
and other financial market policymakers have cooper-
ated in recent years to establish appropriate standards 
for the design, operation, and oversight of CCPs. This 
effort recently culminated in the Group of Ten (G-10) 
and International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions’ Recommendations for Central Counterparties.2 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago actively partic-
ipated in the consultative process leading to the adop-
tion of the recommendations and related financial 
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In the U.S., the regulatory structure has evolved 
toward supporting a “hybrid” system of clearing and 
settlement. For securities transactions, Congress has 
mandated a “national market system,” and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission has favored central-
ized clearing and settlement arrangements. But there 
is no such policy mandate for the derivatives indus-
try. The U.S. thus provides a mixed example of the 
policy approach that I plan to focus on today.
Central counterparty clearing issues also are of 
keen interest to public policymakers here in Europe, 
particularly because of the ongoing European finan-
cial and economic integration. So the issues being 
discussed at this conference are both timely and of 
first-order importance.
As you undoubtedly know, Chicago is home to 
some of the world’s most active exchanges. Chicago 
is also home to three major clearinghouses: the Clear-
ing House Division of the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change, or CME; the Clearing Corporation, which 
you may recognize under its former name, the Board 
of Trade Clearing Corporation, or BOTCC; and the 
Options Clearing Corporation. Together these institu-
tions represent what is sometimes called the “Chicago 
model” of centralized clearing and settlement. This 
model is characterized by counterparty substitution. 
That is, the clearinghouse becomes the legally substi-
tuted buyer to all sellers and the seller to all buyers in 
the markets they serve. This typically occurs through 
a legal process known as “novation.” Over the past 
few decades, this model has been extended to securi-
ties markets around the world. The fact that the Chicago 
model has been so widely emulated is evidence that it 
is a robust and effective way to operate a clearing and 
settlement system.
However, this model was not developed in a 
monolithic way, which is not surprising when you 
think about the historical development of CCPs. This 
history demonstrates that risk management is not the 
only factor motivating the development of clearing 
structures.4 In fact, the first Chicago clearinghouse, 
BOTCC, was founded after the enactment of the Grain 
Futures Act of 1922. With the passage of this law, 
Chicago Board of Trade members faced a choice of 
alternatives for keeping trading records, reporting open 
positions to federal regulators, and paying stamp taxes. 
They could remain in a principal-to-principal relation-
ship with their counterparties and thus keep their re-
cords, make their reports, and pay stamp taxes on their 
gross transactions. Or, they could clear their transactions 
through the clearinghouse and perform those functions 
on a multilateral net basis. Clearly, the multilateral 
approach saved both recordkeeping costs and taxes.
There are additional lessons to learn from the evo-
lution of the Chicago markets. Early on, each Chicago 
clearinghouse was associated with a single exchange. 
While BOTCC was formed as a separate legal entity, 
it only cleared trades from the Board of Trade. The 
clearinghouse of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
was and continues to be a division of its parent ex-
change. Both clearinghouses, however, functioned  
effectively as CCPs. This one-to-one association of 
clearinghouse with exchange changed with the advent 
of exchange demutualization. This forced exchanges 
to decide whether they wished to be in the trade inter-
mediation business, the clearing and settlement busi-
ness, or both. Indeed, the separation of ownership and 
governance of BOTCC from that of the Board of Trade 
led, in recent years, to a situation where these two in-
stitutions pursued somewhat different business objec-
tives. Ultimately, this led to the termination of the 
longstanding relationship between the two. The Board 
of Trade then took the remarkable step of outsourcing 
its clearing operations to its crosstown rival, the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange!
Another historical example that illustrates the 
possibility of de-linking the clearinghouse from the 
exchange comes from the rice futures market of Osaka, 
Japan, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There 
were many different institutions serving that market 
that we might recognize today as clearinghouses, per-
haps as many as 60 at one point.5 This allowed for 
trader choice in the selection of a clearinghouse and, 
presumably, competition among clearinghouses.
These examples also demonstrate a more funda-
mental point: Exchanges and clearinghouses are in 
very different, but interrelated, lines of business and 
serve very different economic functions. To see this, 
let’s look at the core functions performed by CCPs.  
I think most analysts would include at least five core 
functions. All play a role in managing risk in the mar-
kets served by the CCP. The first core function is mul-
tilateral netting of open positions and payments. The 
second is calculation, collection, and custodial man-
agement of margin and collateral payments. The third 
is the adoption of procedures, such as “delivery ver-
sus payment,” that mitigate settlement risk. The fourth 
is mutualization of all or part of the risk of default. 
And finally, the fifth core function is to respond to cri-
sis situations in the interest of the entire community 
of participants in the clearinghouse, not just the inter-
est of a single trader. While other features can be 
identified, I believe these five adequately describe the 
core economic functions CCPs typically perform. 
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the use of a CCP is necessary to perform them, start-
ing with netting. Following counterparty substitution 
in a CCP arrangement, a single multilaterally netted 
position exists between the clearinghouse and each 
market participant. Thus, a “many-to-many” chain of 
credit is replaced by a “one-to-many” arrangement, 
with the CCP at the center of the arrangement. The 
gross obligations of the initial counterparties are, as  
a result, converted to net obligations with respect to a 
single, substituted counterparty, the CCP. This has the 
potential to reduce counterparty risk exposures dramat-
ically and reduce operational costs.
Multilateral netting of obligations is, by definition, 
one of the results of counterparty substitution. Thus, 
CCPs are a convenient mechanism for obtaining the 
risk-management and operational benefits of netting. 
But is this the only institutional arrangement that can 
support netting? The answer is no. First, take the case 
of payment netting. Clearing House Interbank Payments 
System (CHIPS), the privately owned and operated 
U.S. dollar payment system based in New York, con-
ducts continuous netting of dollar payments on both a 
bilateral and multilateral basis without becoming the 
substituted counterparty to the underlying payment 
obligations. Similarly, the CLS (Continuous Linked 
Settlement) Bank provides a hybrid clearing arrange-
ment for foreign exchange transactions, which results 
in multilateral netting of the funding requirements of 
settlement members. At no point does the CLS Bank 
become a substituted counterparty to the underlying 
payment transactions.
What about netting of open positions? This is a 
more complex case than simple payment netting, be-
cause open positions involve forward obligations that 
may be discharged at a future date. Is counterparty 
substitution necessary for multilateral netting of these 
types of obligations? Here again, the answer is no, at 
least under U.S. law. The calculation of a multilateral 
net amount is simple arithmetic. As long as the partici-
pants in a financial market agree to conduct transac-
tions or make payments on a multilateral net basis, 
and that contract is enforceable under applicable law, 
counterparty substitution is not necessary.
Now let’s consider the second role CCPs typical-
ly perform, the management of margin and collateral 
requirements, such as “mark-to-market” payments. 
Derivatives transactions, such as swaps, futures, and 
short options, require discharge of the underlying ob-
ligations at some time in the future. Because of the 
potential for price fluctuations between the time de-
rivatives obligations are undertaken and the time they 
are discharged, participants face exposure to forward 
or “replacement cost” risk. To mitigate that risk, 
clearing arrangements for forward transactions typical-
ly impose “variation margin” requirements on their 
clearing members. These payments are based upon  
a daily or even more frequent marking to market. As 
a result, traders are forced to realize their net profits 
and losses on a regular basis.
Is counterparty substitution necessary to mitigate 
replacement cost risk? The answer is no, again under 
U.S. law. For example, participants in the OTC swaps 
market often collateralize their bilateral net mark-to-
market exposures without the substitution of a central 
counterparty. Such collateral requirements, however, 
can be multilaterally netted without counterparty sub-
stitution. In fact, in the 1990s, the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange proposed to establish a facility to do pre-
cisely this. That proposal did not involve the legal 
substitution of the CME Clearing House or any other 
CCP as counterparty to the underlying swaps transac-
tions. As it happens, that facility never went into op-
eration, but that was for reasons other than its ability 
to perform this underlying economic function.
Now let’s consider the last three roles of CCPs: 
the adoption of procedures to mitigate settlement risk 
(such as delivery versus payment), loss mutualization, 
and centralized crisis management procedures.
Delivery versus payment, or DVP, is a means of 
assuring that related transactions, such as the delivery 
of securities and the corresponding payment, are co-
ordinated and that neither party is exposed to settle-
ment risk. Counterparty substitution is not necessary 
to the implementation of such procedures, which are 
common in payment and securities settlement systems. 
For example, the Federal Reserve’s own system for 
transferring U.S. government securities operates on a 
DVP basis. Yet at no time does the Fed become a sub-
stituted counterparty to the transaction. Similarly, the 
CLS Bank operates on a payment versus payment, or 
PVP, basis, again without counterparty substitution. 
Regardless of whether you call these processes DVP 
or PVP, the result is the same: settlement risk mitiga-
tion without the use of a CCP.
Loss mutualization has the effect of spreading 
losses across some or all nondefaulting traders. This fre-
quently was a feature of clearinghouses for exchanges 
that were owned by their members. Today, however, 
participants in a market who wish to spread the risk 
of loss resulting from default can purchase insurance 
or equivalent risk-shifting protection. As long as they 
agree to purchase insurance or otherwise spread the 
risk of loss, there is no need for counterparty substitu-
tion. Nor is there any need for counterparty substitu-
tion for a centralized institution, such as a clearinghouse, 
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Bank clearinghouses, for example, have historically 
exercised such power on behalf of their members.
So, it is clear that the core economic functions 
performed by CCPs can be provided by a variety of 
alternative institutions. How should public policy re-
spond to this multiplicity of possible clearing arrange-
ments? Even though other institutions can perform 
these functions, it may be the case that CCPs domi-
nate other clearing arrangements from a social welfare 
perspective. If so, then there would be an argument for 
public policy to explicitly encourage or even mandate 
CCPs for all markets. It might also make sense to con-
solidate CCPs from different markets into a common 
institution. But if CCPs or consolidation do not domi-
nate on a cost–benefit basis, then public policy should 
accommodate a wide range of clearing arrangements.
Like all the institutional arrangements I’ve dis-
cussed, centralized clearing arrangements have both 
costs and benefits. On the benefit side, it has been 
widely noted that CCPs can reduce significantly the 
risks to market participants and enhance the liquidity 
of the market.6 This is because CCPs benefit from econ-
omies of scale and scope, compared with more decen-
tralized arrangements. On the cost side, a CCP also 
concentrates risks and responsibility for risk manage-
ment,7 making it a potential single point of failure. 
Concentration carries with it systemic implications, 
since the failure of a CCP would be, by definition, a 
major systemic event.8 This potential risk would only 
be exacerbated by a policy that mandated the consoli-
dation of all CCPs into a single institution. A more 
decentralized clearing arrangement would disperse 
responsibilities for risk management across multiple 
institutions. This would serve to reduce the possibili-
ty that a single institution’s failure might have a cata-
strophic impact.
But this discussion omits perhaps the most impor-
tant advantage from allowing a broader array of clearing 
and settlement arrangements: the benefits of competi-
tion. Indeed, it is the competition for better ideas, su-
perior risk-management procedures, and new products 
that best leads to market innovation in these areas. The 
welfare implications of such innovations can be very 
large. If CCPs were to be mandated as the only accept-
able clearing and settlement arrangement, I fear that a 
good deal of financial market innovation would be 
stifled, with corresponding losses in economic welfare.
Take, for example, the market for credit deriva-
tives.9 I think most people would agree that there are 
real economic benefits generated by these instruments. 
At present, credit derivatives are not centrally cleared. 
This market may not have developed as rapidly as it 
has if it had been required to utilize a central counter-
party arrangement. Alternatively, the imposition of 
centralized clearing might have caused the market to 
develop in a different form, perhaps in “offshore” ju-
risdictions, outside the reach of regulations mandating 
the adoption of a CCP. This is not merely a specula-
tive concern. When interest rate swaps were evolving 
in the 1980s, U.S. law required “futures” to be traded 
on exchanges and, by implication, centrally cleared. 
As a result of this requirement, the interest rate swaps 
market largely moved offshore. The U.S. swaps mar-
ket only recovered when the so-called swaps exemp-
tion freed this market to develop its own trading and 
clearing arrangements. More generally, the imposi-
tion of constraints or restrictions on markets can have 
a significant effect on firm behavior, again with corre-
sponding welfare implications.
Of course, customized financial instruments, such 
as credit derivatives, often become more standardized 
over time, lending themselves more easily to central-
ized clearing and settlement facilities. We may have 
reached that point with respect to credit derivatives, 
and I am aware of some efforts in this direction. It 
seems to me that the best policy prescription is to  
allow the market to adopt whatever clearing arrange-
ment meets its own idiosyncratic needs while still 
satisfying public policy objectives.
New clearing arrangements are emerging all the 
time. Such arrangements may provide a wide range 
of risk-management and operational functions, either 
with or without counterparty substitution.10 I expect 
that such arrangements will continue to evolve as finan-
cial innovation, supported by advances in computing 
and communications technology, continues unabated. 
I view these developments favorably, as they have the 
potential to create even greater efficiency in the clear-
ing and settlement of financial transactions. I remain 
a bit wary, however, that efforts to make CCPs the 
preferred clearing and settlement mechanism or to 
force different markets to share the same CCP may 
suppress a good deal of this beneficial development.
As a longtime Chicagoan, I certainly would not 
want to imply any general criticism of CCPs. Properly 
structured, they do an excellent job of executing critical 
risk-management imperatives. I do see value, however, 
in policy environments that allow multiple clearing 
and settlement arrangements to emerge. And in that 
context, regulation should be flexible, nonprescriptive, 
and risk based to avoid thwarting market innovation. 
Indeed, that is precisely what the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago recommended to the Bank for International 
Settlements’ Committee on Payment and Settlement 50 4Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
Systems and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions in the formulation of prudential stan-
dards for centralized clearing arrangements.
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Once again, thank you for joining us at this con-
ference, and we look forward to your continued in-
volvement in these important policy issues. 